Credible threats and irrational breaches

In the mail today are reprints of three articles by Omri Ben-Shahar (Michigan) (left) and Oren Bar-Gill (NYU), all relating to aspects of coercion in contract and the doctrine of duress, a subject they’ve explored in more depth that probably anyone around today. The three are Threatening an “Irrational” Breach of Contract, 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 143 (2004) (online hereThe Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats, 33 J. Leg. Stud. 391 (2004); and Credible Coercion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 717 (2005) (online here).

The last piece makes the interesting and radical argument that sometimes legal remedies for duress put the victim in a worse position than if no such remedy existed.  Omri has some additional reprints if you’d like one.  Contact him here.