AALS Section on Contracts Session: Best Efforts Clauses, Wednesday, 11:00 AM EST
Section on Contracts:
Contracting for Effort: The Law and Economics of Best and Reasonable Effort Clauses
Contracting for Effort: The Law and Economics of Best and Reasonable Effort Clauses
Best effort clauses in contracts are prevalent and in some sense paradoxical. For instance, in the extensive literature on the economics of contracts, it is almost universally accepted that “effort” is non-contractable because it is unobservable and unverifiable by courts or other arbitral bodies, yet everyday lawyers are busy drafting hundreds or thousands of best effort clauses. What exactly accounts for this apparent disconnect between economic theory and legal practice? We will to explore this question among others by examining scholarship and practice on topic of best effort clauses.- Moderator
Richard Brooks
Professor of Law
New York University School of Law - Speaker
Nathan Atkinson
Postdoctoral Fellow in Law and Economics
ETH Zurich Center for Law & Economics - Speaker
Patrick Bolton
Columbia Law School - Speaker
Julian Nyarko
Assistant Professor of Law
Stanford Law School - Speaker
Sarath Sanga
Associate Professor of Law
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law
Sarath Sanga’s principal areas of research are corporate law and contract theory. An interdisciplinary scholar, his work has appeared in leading law, economics, and scientific journals, including the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Law & Economics, California Law Review, and Science. Sanga holds a BA in economics from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, a PhD in economics from the University of California, Berkeley, and a JD from Yale. - Speaker
Alexander Stremitzer
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law
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