Is the Death of a Boy on a Plane an “Accident” under the Montreal Convention?
Shortly after take-off on a flight from Honduras on June 4, 2022, a fourteen-year-old boy, traveling with relatives had trouble breathing. His inhaler did not help, and by the time his relatives called for help, the plane was at altitude and the boy was unconscious. Two passengers with medical expertise got him lying down and administered CPR and used an automated external defibrillator. The boy did not survive. He weighed weighed 319 pounds and suffered from asthma, sleep apnea, and type II diabetes.
His Estate sued American Airlines (American), alleging claims under the Montreal convention, loss of consortium, and breach of contract. In Arzu v. American Airlines, Inc., the U.S. District Court for Northern District of Texas ruled on competing motinos for summary judgment.
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention provides in relevant part that the airline is liable “for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft .. . .” In Air France v. Saks, in which Justice O’Connor (below) provided a master class in treaty interpretation, the Supreme Court defined “accident” as “an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.” That case related to the Warsaw Convention, but the Montreal Convention has succeeded the Warsaw Convention, and the same definition applies.
Clearly, American was not responsible for the boy’s medical condition, but the Estate argued that American’s response to the boy’s medical emergency departed in various ways from the procedures prescribed in American’s Inflight Manual. The Court acknowledged that the airline’s response was imperfect in various ways, but responses to emergency situations are rarely perfect, and courts must allow for some flexibility to account for specific circumstances. In any case, nothing that transpired amounted to an “accident” for the purposes of the Montreal Convention. Because there was no accident there was no Montreal Convention claim. Because there was no Montreal Convention claim, there could also be no loss of consortium claim, which would have been derivative from the Montreal Convention claim.
It seems likely that the Estate’s breach of contract claim would be preempted by the Montreal Convention. There are exceptions to preemption, but they seem pretty clearly not to apply on these facts. The Court determined that it did not need to decide that issue because the breach of contract damages that the Estate sought were discretionary under the Conditions of Carriage. Failure to make a discretionary payment is not a breach of contract.
The Court granted American’s motion for summary judgment on all claims and denied the Estate’s motion for summary judgment.