Promissory Estoppel Claim Based on ChatBot’s Promises Dismissed
In Before the Law, Franz Kafka (right) describes a man whose way to the law is barred by an intimidating man who guards the gate. The man tries to convince the guard to let him through the gate; he bribes the guard, he remonstrates. He becomes so familiar with the guard that he even gets to know the fleas that live in the guard’s fur-lined collar, and he enlists the fleas to let him in. To no avail. The man dies outside of the gate to the law, and because the gate existed only for the now-dead man, the guard then closes it.
Similarly, our Mr. Smith, unable to get a response from Substack, appealed to its chatbot, which provided bland assurances that Substack responds to every e-mail and to every complaint. And yet, Substack did not respond. Mr. Smith filed a pro se complaint against Substack and Mr. Doe, alleging promissory estoppel and deceit, but Mr. Doe has not been served. Mr. Smith withdrew his deceit claim.
In Smith v. Substack, Inc., a federal magistrate judge in Northern California dismissed Mr. Smith’s promissory estoppel claim. First, the magistrate found the chatbot’s promises too indefinite to be enforceable, as it did not specify how or when Substack would reply. Mr. Smith could ask some pointed follow-up questions, but I suppose his time for amending his complaint has elapsed.
I’m not sure why the magistrate saw the need to rule on that element on promissory estoppel given that Mr. Smith had alleged no detrimental reliance. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss he alleged reliance in the form of a new criminal complaint that he filed after having received assurances from the bot. This he alleges was a waste of his time and of the time of the police, and he also suffered emotional distress and had to pay for a phone call to the police. I’m not sure any of this is legally relevant, but in any case, none of it was mentioned in the complaint. The magistrate also did not think that even the new allegations would establish detrimental reliance, and so the magistrate dismissed the promissory estoppel claim against Substack with prejudice, finding that amendment would be futile.
The action against John Doe is still alive, but barely. Mr. Smith had until January 10th to identify John Doe. Otherwise, that claim will also be dismissed with prejudice. Given that there is no reason to think the claims against John Doe are any more viable than those against Substack, naming the individual defendant would seem to be a waste of time.