Seventh Circuit Parses “Generate” and “Receive” in an Attorney’s Breach of Contract Suit
In 2001, Kanosky & Associates (now Kanosky Bresney) hired Lawrence Hess to handle medical malpractice suits. In 2007, the firm fired Mr. Hess. Under Mr. Hess’s employment agreement, Hess was entitled to bonus pay in the amount of fifteen percent of all fees “generated over the base salary.” The employment agreement also stated that the “[b]onus shall increase” to twenty-five percent “on all fees received annually in excess of $750,000.00.”
Mr. Hess conceded that he was not entitled to any additional fees “received,” but he claimed that his work had “generated” fees for which he had not been compensated. The District Court found that “generated” and “received” had the same meaning within the employment agreement, and in oral argument before the Seventh Circuit in Hess v. Kanosky Bresney, Mr. Hess conceded as much.
However, Mr. Hess pointed to a 2002 modification of his employment agreement that entitled him to 40% of all revenue “generated.” Both parties also relied on additional language in Section 8 of the original employment agreement:
[W]here the Corporation retains clients upon Employees [sic] termination that Employee has no proprietary interest in fees to be earned since the Employee is to be fully compensated through his salary and/or bonus for all work done while an Employee of the Corporation” (emphasis added).
Mr. Hess read this provision to entitle him to compensation for revenues “generated” while he was an employee; the firm read the provision to bar him from any post-employment compensation.
The Seventh Circuit rejected Mr. Hess’s arguments. While implying that the employment agreement could have been more clearly drafted, the Court found that reading “generate” and “receive” as synonyms results in a simple, straightforward compensation scheme. Reading generate as Hess would have it read, leads to headaches, as the contract does not specify (and doing so would be very difficult) how one is to determine any individual attorney’s role in “generating” fees. Hess’s interpretation of the contract was “less plausible” than the firm’s, and he produced no extrinsic evidence suggesting that his interpretation should be favored despite its facial implausibility. Given the Court’s presumption that the firms documents use “generate” and “receive” interchangeably, Mr. Hess’s 2002 Modification did not avail him.