Kmart Cannot Enforce Arbitration Agreement with Class of Infant (Minor) Plaintiffs

In 2013, Kmart hired Adrian Lopez, then age 16, as a cashier.  Before beginning work, Lopez received online training, and in order to do so, he had to acknowledge receipt of various Kmart forms, including an arbitration agreement.  One month after turning 18, Lopez filed a putative class action lawsuit against his employer for breaches of California’s wage and hours laws. Kmart sought to compel arbitration.

Under California Family Code § 6710, minors (under the age of 18) may enter into contracts, but they have a right of disaffirmation “before majority or within a reasonable time afterwards.”  In Lopez v. Kmart Corp., Magistrate Corley, of the Northern District of California, held that Lopez disaffirmed his arbitration agreement with Kmart by filing the lawsuit within one month of turning 18 and that one month was a “reasonable” time under § 6710.  

While California Family Code § 6712 excepts certain categories of contracts from the right of disaffirmation, Kmart did not argue that its contract with Lopez fell within any of those categories.  Instead, Kmart sought to argue that the contract could not be disaffirmed because California Family Code § 6711 removes the right of disaffirmation of any contract entered into “under the express authority or direction of a statute.”  Magistrate Corley disagreed with Kmart, finding that § 6711 did not apply and that the argument was waived because first raised at oral argument.

Kmart next argued that §6710 only applies to contracts for goods or services and not to employment contracts.  Magistrate Corley simply noted that the statutory language contains no such limitation.  In any case, the contract was for services, as Lopez was to serve as a cashier.  

Finally, Kmart urged the court to deny the disaffirmation in the exercise of its equitable powers.  Magistrate Corley noted that she could not exercise such powers where the authority for disaffirmation was statutory.  Kmart cited to cases from other jurisdictions in which courts had exercised such equitable powers in the employment context, but Magistrate Corley noted that they did so in the context of common law, not statutory infancy doctrines.