Executive Pay at Delphi
When it comes to executive compensation, scholars tend to fall into two camps. Some defend current levels of executive compensation as the product of a market. Simply put, highly skilled executives negotiate for very rich compensation packages because of the value they bring to the companies that they lead and because they would not agree to take on the risk and responsibility of such leadership if they were not appropriately compensated. Others (and I am in this camp) point out that executive compensation packages are not really the product of arms-length transactions since executives negotiate their salaries with boards of directors that consist largely of other executives who want to hire good people but also want executive compensation to be generous.
My reading of reports on the Delphi case suggests what would happen if executive pay were indeed the product of a negotiation involving an entity committed to protecting the interests of corporate constituencies other than management. Last week, in approving Delphi’s reorganization plan, Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain trimmed Delphi’s proposed executive incentive pay from $87 million to $16.5 million, as reported here and here. Judge Drain questioned the compensation schemes because they were challenged by representatives from two unions that in turn represented Delphi workers who had accepted cuts in their own compensation packages in order to pave the way for reorganization. Under questioning from Judge Drain, Delphi’s executive compensation consultant conceded that the approach he recommended was “novel,” “rare,” and “not the norm,” according to Gretchen Morgenson’s report in The New York Times.
I merely suggest that when parties reach an agreement for $87 million in compensation but then agree to $16.5 million in compensation under pressure from a judge, the original agreement is not the product of an arms-length negotiation. Would you be willing to do your job for less than 20% of your current salary? Perhaps Delphi has entered into some side agreement to provide additional compensation to executives in years to come, but if that is not the case, the Delphi reorganization plan seems like strong evidence of extraordinary elasticity in the market for executive services.
[Jeremy Telman]