Are independent judges good for business?

It seems intuitive that businesses would value an an independent judiciary that can limit the power of the state.  And a new study by Daniel Klerman (Southern Cal) and Paul Mahoney (Virginia) suggest that this is, in fact, the case.  Studying the returns in the equity market that follow moves toward increasing judicial independence and prestige in 18th century England (e.g., increasing pay and granting tenure on good behavior), the pair conclude that there is in fact a positive correlation.  The abstract:

This paper assesses the impact of changes in judicial independence on equity markets. North and Weingast (1989) argue that judicial independence and other institutional changes inaugurated by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 improved public and private finance in England by putting restraints on the government. We calculate abnormal equity returns at critical points in the passage of statutes giving judges greater security of tenure and higher salaries. Early eighteenth-century legislation granting tenure during good behavior is associated with large and statistically significant positive abnormal returns. Other statutes had positive but generally insignificant effects.